USAID Launches New Agricultural Programs in Haiti and Africa

Using less than 1% of the federal budget, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is able to generate an enormous return on investment when it comes to increasing international economic opportunities and reducing global poverty. In June, USAID launched two new programs in Haiti and Africa under Feed the Future, President Obama’s global hunger and food security initiative.

Feed the Future North is a 5-year, $87.8 million program that seeks to increase agricultural incomes in six of Haiti’s northernmost watersheds. Developed in cooperation with the Government of Haiti Ministry of Agriculture, the primary focus of the program is on increasing the yields from corn, bean, rice, plantain, and cocoa crops.

For the past three decades, Haiti has suffered from a systematic decline in its agricultural output, due in large part to natural disasters, flooding, and erosion. Feed the Future North will provide key investments in agricultural infrastructure and facilitate the transfer of innovative technologies in an effort to increase farmers’ yields.  In addition, the program will work to establish public works and good governance throughout the region in order to promote stability and increase local capacity.

In accordance with USAID principles, the program will be country-led, focused on local capacity building, results-oriented, market-driven, scalable, coordinated with outside donors, and will consider the gender and environmental implications of its actions. USAID is hoping to impact at least 40,000 rural Haitian households through this program.

In Africa, USAID has partnered with the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) to launch a $47 million, three-year Scaling Seeds and Technologies Partnership in Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, and Tanzania. According USAID’s most recent press release, the program is primarily focused on promoting the “commercialization, distribution and adoption of improved seeds and other key technologies.”

USAID and AGRA aim to increase high-quality seed production by 45 percent in 3 years, along with ensuring that an additional 40 percent of farmers receive access to advanced farming technologies. Beyond the immediate impact of improved seed technology and increased agricultural output, program administrators believe that the partnership will also help spur local economic growth and reduce child hunger and poverty.

The success of past USAID programs provides a reason to be optimistic about the future of these projects. From 2009 to 2013, USAID operated a Mango Program within its Pakistan Firms Project with a budget of $5.8 million. According to the Pakistan Tribune, mango sales have increased by $20.5 million in that time. The program also helped 26 orchards achieve Global GAP certification, which is necessary for exporting to certain high-end markets. The increase in exports and sales created around 2,500 jobs, and led to the training of more than 3,700 farmers.

The Transnational Impact of Los Zetas

Los Zetas is one of the most powerful and violent cartels of the seven primary cartels currently operating in Mexico. In addition to drug trafficking, it is accused of money laundering, human trafficking, kidnapping, extortion, intellectual property theft, and executions, making it a truly “polycriminal” organization. Part of its strength comes from its strategy of taking over territories where criminal activity already flourished and co-opting that activity for itself. While Mexico bears the brunt of the violence stemming from this drug trafficking organization (DTO), Los Zetas’ reach extends throughout Central America, the United States, Europe, and the Middle East. The actions of this group have significant transnational impact, generating instability and demanding resources wherever it operates.

Los Zetas

History

Los Zetas did not begin as a drug trafficking organization, but as the enforcement branch of the Gulf Cartel. In the late 1990’s, Osiel Cardenas Guillen was gaining control of the Gulf Cartel, but there were still several rivals for that position. His grasp on the cartel at that point was tenuous, and he understood that he would be a primary target for violence until the territory was consolidated. To defend himself, Guillen recruited 31 men from the Mexican military to serve as his bodyguards, many of who had served in the Grupos Aeromoviles de Fuerzas Especiales (GAFE), a Special Forces unit. This group would become the foundation of Los Zetas.

Once Guillen felt secure in his position, he expanded the role of the Zetas. Between 1997 and 2004, Los Zetas were in charge of executing rival leaders in addition to providing personal security. Arturo Guzman (Z-1), Rogelio Gonzalaz Pizana (Z-2), and Heriberto Lazcano (Z-3) led most of the execution missions, with operations “often capped off with an unprecedented act of barbarism.”[1] Their Special Forces experience contributed greatly to their success, as they were better trained than the members of other cartels, the police, and even the military.

Between late 2004 and early 2010, Los Zetas worked to gain its independence from the Gulf Cartel. Guillen was captured by the Mexican military in 2003, which gave Heriberto Lazcano (Z-3), who was by then the leader of Los Zetas, the opportunity to strike out on his own. Lazcano recruited from Guatemalan Special Forces and increased training camps in the state of Tamaulipas, the home of Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas. In addition to its previous activities, Los Zetas worked to gain control of the drug trafficking corridors, also known as plazas, charging smaller DTOs for the use of Zeta controlled routes. Los Zetas has also been tied to several massacres and prison riots, most notably the San Fernando Massacre of April 2011 that left 193 people dead.[2] Its willingness to use violence to achieve its goals has led to its reputation as “most formidable death squad to have worked for organized crime in Mexican history.”[3]

Current Situation

Lazcano remained in control of Los Zetas until October 2012 when he was reportedly killed by marines in Progreso, Coahuila.[4] Unfortunately, Zetas members stole his body from the funeral home the day after the killing, so an irrefutable positive identification was never possible. After the death of Lazcano, Miguel Angel Trevino Morales (Z-40) took control of Los Zetas. Despite being “scorned as a traitor by many of his own cartel soldiers,” his reputation for excessive violence secured his position.[5]

Most recent reports indicate that Los Zetas has now surpassed both the Sinaloa and the Gulf Cartels in terms of geographic control and power. At the end of 2011, the Zetas operated in more than half of the states in Mexico though it remains concentrated in the Northeast.[6]  While most of the other cartels maintain control of their territory by providing security and fulfilling the basic needs of the citizens in their territory, Los Zetas continues to “[prey] on local populations rather than wooing them with jobs, charity and public services.”[7]

Transnational Impact

Mexico

Within Mexico, Los Zetas has had a major impact on day-to-day life. However, high levels of violence and drug trafficking are not the only concerns. In Coahuila state, Los Zetas is alleged to have taken control of the coal mining industry, running the mines or buying the coal and then “reselling it to a state-owned company at fabulous margins that can see them make a profit 30 times greater than their initial investment.”[8] With approximately 95% of Mexico’s coal coming from Coahuila, Los Zetas is in control of a major part of Mexico’s economy. Since coal mining is a licit business venture, it creates another avenue for money laundering. In addition, due to the Zetas ability to pay incredibly low wages and operate unsafe mines, coal is even more lucrative than drug running, and is without the risk inherent in illicit activity.[9]

Los Zetas is also involved in petroleum theft from Mexico’s government oil company, Pemex. In 2011, 3.35 million barrels of fuel were stolen from Pemex, depriving the company of more than $1 billion.[10] While not all of the stolen fuel can be traced back to the Zetas, captured Zetas founder Raul Lucio Hernandez told investigators that “rustling crude and refined petroleum had become a major source of income for the gang.”[11] In addition, the Zetas control the vast majority of the territory in which Pemex operates. This appropriation of government resources harms Mexico’s overall economy and impacts its ability to function as a major player in the global market.

The United States

As the nearest neighbor and primary destination for smuggled drugs, the United States has also been impacted by the presence of Los Zetas. In the past year, reports have indicated that Los Zetas may have joined forces with the U.S. gang network Mara Salvatrucha-13 (MS-13), which operates in 42 states and Washington, D.C.[12] The expansion of the Zeta drug network is contingent on developing new distribution channels, and an agreement with MS-13 gives it a pre-existing network of personnel and protection. By working together, both the Zetas and MS-13 increase their power and Los Zetas gains “an agility, responsiveness, and adaptability that [it] currently lacks.”[13] The resulting hybrid of cartel and gang poses a unique challenge to law enforcement officials in both Mexico and the United States.

Spillover violence is another concern for U.S. government officials. The Zetas are concentrated in northeastern Mexico, directly across the border from Texas, and are known to have hubs in Laredo, Dallas, and Houston. The Zeta-attributed killing of 49 people happened in Monterrey, only 80 miles south of the U.S. border.[14] The mass grave with more than 140 victims, also attributed to Los Zetas, was found just across the border from Brownsville, Texas.[15] Finally, several murders of U.S. citizens in Texas and Arizona have also been attributed to Los Zetas.

Central America

The cooperation between MS-13 and Los Zetas does not end at the U.S.-Mexico border. While originally based in Los Angeles, MS-13 has begun to shift its leadership back to El Salvador. The MS-13 in El Salvador has close ties with Los Zetas, evidenced particularly by the two groups cooperation in human trafficking. In 2010, after a brief war over control of the smuggling route between southern Mexico and the United States, MS-13 and the Zetas came to an agreement in which Los Zetas controlled the northern half and MS-13 controlled the southern half. By the end of 2012, they had “reached a far more favorable and lucrative arrangement” in which only MS-13 coyotes are allowed to use Zeta controlled routes.[16] In addition, Los Zetas has recruited MS-13 members and given them extensive military training while paying the clica, or local level MS-13 gang, for their service.[17] The relationship between Los Zetas and MS-13 strengthens both groups, contributing to further destabilization in El Salvador and Mexico beyond what the groups could have achieved alone.

In early 2011, Los Zetas began their campaign to take control of territory in Guatemala. Guatemala is an important transit point in the narcotics trafficking chain, in part due to its ineffective government. Guatemala is also the point at which the price per kilo of cocaine is still relatively inexpensive. By taking control of territory in Guatemala, Los Zetas’ profits could “almost double relative to what one makes by taking possession in Mexico.”[18] It allied with Guatemalan trafficker Horst Walther Overdick and his groups and used overwhelming violence to overthrow the Leon family, which had previously controlled a majority of the northern territory.  Since its incursion into Guatemala, Los Zetas has infiltrated the army and police, set up local businesses for money laundering, and increased the levels of drug consumption in country by paying in product rather than money.[19] The presence of the Zetas in Guatemala is undermining the already weak government and intimidating the local population.

Europe

A recent report from Europol indicates that Mexican criminal groups, including Los Zetas, are attempting to gain a foothold in Europe. Cocaine prices in Europe are almost double those in the United States, making it an appealing market for all Mexican DTOs.[20] So far, only a few acts of violence have been attributed to their arrival, though it remains a concern for European officials. Europol singled out Los Zetas in particular for its involvement in human trafficking between Northeast Europe and Mexico.[21]

Los Zetas is believed to have significant ties to the ‘Ndrangheta, an Italian mafia group. The ‘Ndrangheta maintain a monopoly on the cocaine market in Europe, making them the ideal partner for a Mexican DTO attempting to break into that market. The mafia group was originally allied with the Gulf Cartel, a relationship that was uncovered during DEA’s Project Reckoning in 2008.[22] Since that time, Los Zetas has become the main cocaine supplier to the ‘Ndrangheta, transporting the drugs from Mexico to New York before shipping them to the Italian port of Gioia Tauro.[23] As Los Zetas increases its global territory, it becomes an even harder target for both Mexican and international law enforcement efforts.

Middle East

Los Zetas also has significant ties with groups and persons in the Middle East. In 2011, the U.S. government charged Ayman Joumma, a Lebanese drug kingpin, with cocaine distribution and money laundering.[24] Allegedly, Joumma and his associates coordinated “multi-ton shipments of cocaine from Colombia to Los Zetas Mexican drug cartel” in addition to laundering hundreds of millions of dollars of Zeta drug money through the Lebanese Canadian Bank SAL.[25] Joumma also had ties to Hezbollah, a U.S. designated foreign terrorist organization (FTO) that serves as Iran’s proxy in Lebanon. This connection contributes to the increased likelihood of collaboration between Los Zetas and Hezbollah. The U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security noted that the relationship between Hezbollah and DTOs goes back as far as 2005, and proceeds from the drug business could be providing additional funding for the FTO.[26]

A separate incident indicates Iran’s willingness to work with Los Zetas, though not Los Zetas’ desire to assist a terrorist organization. In October 2011, the United States accused Iranian officials of conspiring to murder Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to the United States. The Quds Force, part of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, was also accused of conspiring to traffic opium with the assistance of Los Zetas. According to U.S. officials, an Iranian-American and a Quds officer believed that they were dealing with representatives from the Mexican DTO when in fact they were speaking with a DEA informant. Reportedly, an Iranian acquaintance believed that the informant was a member of Los Zetas, and he approached the informant “with a proposition to hire the cartel to carry out terrorist attacks inside the United States,” specifically targeting the Saudi Arabian ambassador.[27] The Iranian government strongly denies any involvement in the plot; however, this incident could indicate a willingness on the part of more fringe groups in the Middle East to contract work to Los Zetas or other DTOs.

Conclusion

Los Zetas is a truly transnational criminal organization, with a reach that spans the United States, Central America, Europe, and the Middle East. In general, organized crime undermines rule of law and governance structures, and contributes to insurgency and instability.[28] Enormous amounts of financial and human capital have to be diverted to contain the violence and criminal activity, which decreases the resources available for standard government operations. Los Zetas is particularly adept at fostering instability wherever it operates. Its connections to other criminal and terrorist organizations serve only to destabilize even more countries, which strengthens its ability to function with impunity. Los Zetas’ acceptance of extreme violence and willingness to participate in any revenue-generating endeavor with almost any business partner make it a considerable threat to the international order.

**Written May 2013**

Bibliography

“175 Alleged Gulf Cartel Members Arrested in Massive International Law Enforcement Operation,” DEA Public Affairs, Sept 17 2008, http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/pressrel/pr091708.html

Agren, David, “Los Zetas: Mexico’s most feared drug cartel has a long reach – but its grasp is less certain,” Toronto Star, Feb 4 2012, http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2012/02/04/los_zetas_mexicos_most_feared_drug_cartel_has_a_long_reach_but_its_grasp_is_less_certain.html

Althaus, Dudley, “Pemex struggles to stop spike in petroleum theft,” Houston Chronicle, Aug 16 2012, http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Pemex-struggles-to-stop-spike-in-petroleum-theft-3794552.php

“Black gold on the black market,” The Economist, Aug 4 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21559962

Caistor, Nick, “Mexico’s drugs gang ‘death squad’,” BBC News, Sept 4 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-11189017

Corcoran, Patrick, “Italy’s ‘Ndrangheta Mafia: A Powerful Ally for the Zetas,” Insight Crime, Aug 10 2011, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/italys-ndrangheta-mafia-a-powerful-ally-for-the-zetas

“Crime and instability: Case studies of transnational threats,” UNODC, UN, February 2010, http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Crime_and_instability_2010_final_26march.pdf

Dudley, Steven, “The Zetas in Guatemala,” In Sight: Organized Crime in the Americas, Sept 8 2011, http://www.countthecosts.org/sites/default/files/Zetas_in_Guatemala.pdf

Farah, Douglas and Pamela Phillips Lum, “Central American Gangs and Transnational Criminal Orgnanizations,” International Assessment and Strategy Center, Feb 24 2013, http://www.strategycenter.net/docLib/20130224_CenAmGangsandTCOs.pdf

Fantz, Ashley, “49 headless bodies – just another crime in Mexico drug war?” CNN, May 17 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/17/world/mexico-decapitated-bodies

Grant, Will, “Heriberto Lazcano: The fall of a Mexican drug lord,” BBC News, Oct 13 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-19922962

Holman, John, “Mexican drug gangs dig into mining industry,” Al Jazeera, Jan 4 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/01/201313144952293200.html

Kreider, Randy and Mark Schone, “New Zetas Cartel Leader Violent ‘To the Point of Sadism’,” ABC News, Oct 12 2012, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/ruthless-drug-lord-takes-control-deadly-cartel/story?id=17455674#.UX1W_yv71JF

Logan, Samuel, “A Profile of Los Zetas: Mexico’s Second Most Powerful Drug Cartel,” Combating Terrorism Center at Westpoint, Feb 16, 2012, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/a-profile-of-los-zetas-mexicos-second-most-powerful-drug-cartel

McCaul, Representative Michael T., “A Line in the Sand: Countering Crime, Violence and Terror at the Southwest Border,” U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management, November 2012, http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/11-15-12-Line-in-the-Sand.pdf

“Powerful Mexican Criminal Syndicates Attempt to Develop their European Drugs Business,” Europol, April 12 2013, https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/powerful-mexican-criminal-syndicates-attempt-develop-their-european-drugs-business

Rene, Pierre-Marc, “Mexican druglords strike gold in coal,” AFP, Nov 17 2012, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5grQ4C5hXEldND2tqms0uZuXsCjaQ

Rueda, Manuel, “The Eerie Logic of the Zetas Cartel’s Mot Infamous Actions,” ABC News, Oct 10 2012, http://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/News/zetas-mexico-infamous-acts/story?id=17445680#.UX1Xgyv71JE

Ryan, Jason, “Lebanese Drug Lord Charged in US: Links to Zetas and Hezbollah,” ABC News, Dec 13 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/12/lebanese-drug-lord-charged-in-us-links-to-zetas-and-hezbollah/

Savage, Charlie and Scott Shane, “Iranians Accused of a Plot to Kill Saudis’ U.S. Envoy,” The New York Times, Oct 11 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/12/us/us-accuses-iranians-of-plotting-to-kill-saudi-envoy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

Seper, Jerry, “Brutal Mexican drug gang crosses into U.S.,” Washington Times, April 19 2011, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/apr/19/violent-mexican-drug-gang-expands-into-us/?page=all

Sullivan, John P and Adam Elkus, “Los Zetas and MS-13: Nontraditional Alliances,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 5 Issue 6, June 2012

“U.S. Charges Alleged Lebanese Drug Kingpin with Laundering Drug Proceeds for Mexican and Colombian Drug Cartels,” Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Dec 13 2011, http://www.justice.gov/usao/vae/news/2011/12/20111213joumaanr.html

Wills, Santiago, “Mexican Cartel Presence Threatens European Security, Europol Says,” ABC News, April 18 2013, http://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/mexican-cartel-presence-threatens-european-security-europol/story?id=18987883#.UX2DECv70Vl

“Zetas Now Mexico’s Biggest Cartel, Report Says,” Fox News Latino, Jan 26 2012, http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2012/01/26/zetas-now-mexicos-biggest-cartel-report-says/

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[1] Logan, Samuel, “A Profile of Los Zetas: Mexico’s Second Most Powerful Drug Cartel,” Combating Terrorism Center at Westpoint, Feb 16, 2012, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/a-profile-of-los-zetas mexicos-second-most-powerful-drug-cartel

[2] Rueda, Manuel, “The Eerie Logic of the Zetas Cartel’s Mot Infamous Actions,” ABC News, Oct 10 2012, http://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/News/zetas-mexico-infamous-acts/story?id=17445680#.UX1Xgyv71JE

[3] Caistor, Nick, “Mexico’s drugs gang ‘death squad’,” BBC News, Sept 4 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-11189017

[4] Grant, Will, “Heriberto Lazcano: The fall of a Mexican drug lord,” BBC News, Oct 13 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-19922962

[5] Kreider, Randy and Mark Schone, “New Zetas Cartel Leader Violent ‘To the Point of Sadism’,” ABC News, Oct 12 2012, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/ruthless-drug-lord-takes-control-deadly-cartel/story?id=17455674#.UX1W_yv71JF

[6] “Zetas Now Mexico’s Biggest Cartel, Report Says,” Fox News Latino, Jan 26 2012, http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2012/01/26/zetas-now-mexicos-biggest-cartel-report-says/

[7] Agren, David, “Los Zetas: Mexico’s most feared drug cartel has a long reach – but its grasp is less certain,” Toronto Star, Feb 4 2012, http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2012/02/04/los_zetas_mexicos_most_feared_drug_cartel_has_a_long_reach_but_its_grasp_is_less_certain.html

[8] Rene, Pierre-Marc, “Mexican druglords strike gold in coal,” AFP, Nov 17 2012, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5grQ4C5hXEldND2tqms0uZuXsCjaQ

[9] Holman, John, “Mexican drug gangs dig into mining industry,” Al Jazeera, Jan 4 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/01/201313144952293200.html

[10] “Black gold on the black market,” The Economist, Aug 4 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21559962

[11] Althaus, Dudley, “Pemex struggles to stop spike in petroleum theft,” Houston Chronicle, Aug 16 2012, http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Pemex-struggles-to-stop-spike-in-petroleum-theft-3794552.php

[12] Sullivan, John P and Adam Elkus, “Los Zetas and MS-13: Nontraditional Alliances,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 5 Issue 6, June 2012

[13] ibid

[14] Fantz, Ashley, “49 headless bodies – just another crime in Mexico drug war?” CNN, May 17 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/17/world/mexico-decapitated-bodies

[15] Seper, Jerry, “Brutal Mexican drug gang crosses into U.S.,” Washington Times, April 19 2011, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/apr/19/violent-mexican-drug-gang-expands-into-us/?page=all

[16] Farah, Douglas and Pamela Phillips Lum, “Central American Gangs and Transnational Criminal Orgnanizations,” International Assessment and Strategy Center, Feb 24 2013, http://www.strategycenter.net/docLib/20130224_CenAmGangsandTCOs.pdf

[17] ibid.

[18] Dudley, Steven, “The Zetas in Guatemala,” In Sight: Organized Crime in the Americas, Sept 8 2011, http://www.countthecosts.org/sites/default/files/Zetas_in_Guatemala.pdf

[19] ibid.

[20] Wills, Santiago, “Mexican Cartel Presence Threatens European Security, Europol Says,” ABC News, April 18 2013, http://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/mexican-cartel-presence-threatens-european-security-europol/story?id=18987883#.UX2DECv70Vl

[21] “Powerful Mexican Criminal Syndicates Attempt to Develop their European Drugs Business,” Europol, April 12 2013, https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/powerful-mexican-criminal-syndicates-attempt-develop-their-european-drugs-business

[22] “175 Alleged Gulf Cartel Members Arrested in Massive International Law Enforcement Operation,” DEA Public Affairs, Sept 17 2008, http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/pressrel/pr091708.html

[23] Corcoran, Patrick, “Italy’s ‘Ndrangheta Mafia: A Powerful Ally for the Zetas,” Insight Crime, Aug 10 2011, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/italys-ndrangheta-mafia-a-powerful-ally-for-the-zetas

[24] Ryan, Jason, “Lebanese Drug Lord Charged in US: Links to Zetas and Hezbollah,” ABC News, Dec 13 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/12/lebanese-drug-lord-charged-in-us-links-to-zetas-and-hezbollah/

[25] “U.S. Charges Alleged Lebanese Drug Kingpin with Laundering Drug Proceeds for Mexican and Colombian Drug Cartels,” Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Dec 13 2011, http://www.justice.gov/usao/vae/news/2011/12/20111213joumaanr.html

[26] McCaul, Representative Michael T., “A Line in the Sand: Countering Crime, Violence and Terror at the Southwest Border,” U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management, November 2012, http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/11-15-12-Line-in-the-Sand.pdf

[27] Savage, Charlie and Scott Shane, “Iranians Accused of a Plot to Kill Saudis’ U.S. Envoy,” The New York Times, Oct 11 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/12/us/us-accuses-iranians-of-plotting-to-kill-saudi-envoy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

[28] “Crime and instability: Case studies of transnational threats,” UNODC, UN, February 2010, http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Crime_and_instability_2010_final_26march.pdf

Review: “Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks: Why al-Qaida May Be Less Threatening Than Many Think”

In “Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks: Why al-Qaida May Be Less Threatening Than Many Think” by Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Calvert Jones, the authors attempt to prove that the structure of most international criminal and terrorist groups creates significant disadvantages for those groups and increases the ability of states to combat them. While knowing the structure of the threat is important for law enforcement groups, and the authors’ assertion that hierarchical state law enforcement is capable of combating these networked threats may be correct, the conclusion that the organizational structure is contributing to the weakening of transnational criminal groups is hampered by the inclusion of independent entities in the networks, the failure to recognize that many organizations do have hierarchies at the highest levels, and the fact that most organizations are still capable of operating with relative success despite being a supposedly weak network.

Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones primary conclusion is that, while the majority of literature extolls the virtues of networked groups, the weaknesses of such an organizational system outweigh the benefits for most illicit transnational groups. The benefits of networked organizations are derived primarily from research on licit business models, which are then assumed to apply equally as well to criminal organizations. Information flows are presumably more efficient, the ability of groups to expand sideways is increased, the expanded network is supposed to be both more adaptable to a changing external environment and more able to resist fragmentation, and learning capacity is increased in both speed and quality. When applied to criminal organizations, these factors are presumed to increase their ability to evade arrest and maintain their illicit activities. Jones and Eilstrup-Sangiovanni disagree with unquestioned application of the licit model to transnational criminal entities, arguing that these virtues are outstripped by the weaknesses inherent in illicit networks. They believe that the necessary security measures inhibit the flow of information, a lack of a strong, centralized decision-maker, limits to effective scalability, coordination problems, security breaches, and lack of central training overwhelm the benefits derived from a networked structure and ultimately weaken the illicit network, making it more susceptible to law enforcement agencies.

The argument first falters with their inclusion of independent actors as a key part of the terrorist group. Certainly, an increase in the number of people with access to the group results in poorer security, less training, and less direct guidance to lower level members. However, as they point out, the new members “seek guidance, legitimacy, and tactical support from the network … but are not afraid to act independently.”[1] While the network may be aware of these independent operators and may have had a hand in training them, they are not actually a part of the organization, and their actions should not reflect upon the terrorist network as whole. The security breaches and independent decision-making are not a result of the organizational structure, but of the increase in the ability of individuals to engage in illicit activity under any name they wish. Networks may be able to be monitored and affected by traditional law enforcement mechanisms, but the independent operators are “particularly hard to identify before they strike and therefore pose a major security threat.”[2] Since these individuals are only nominally part of the group, they hardly threaten the security of the network as a whole, and ultimately prove to be an even greater risk to state security.

In addition, the authors overlook the fact that many criminal and terrorist groups are a hybrid combination of network and semi-hierarchical structures. At the low- and mid-levels, the risks mentioned above, such as security breaches and a lack of strategic direction, are rendered moot. If a security breach occurs among the lowest level, the security measures will prevent any connection with the high-level operatives. These low-level networks also have no need to be involved in a strategic plan, since they receive directives from the more connected members of the network. The higher levels operate more similarly to corporations or family businesses, and in both criminal and terrorist groups there are leaders that emerge from within the network. Both have a “defined structure and have processes to make collective decisions,” as well as “a clear division of labor and a recognizable hierarchy”, all of which run counter to the concept of a weak network.[3][4] The problems inherent in networked groups, and the issues created by a hierarchical system, can both be mitigated by a combination of the two. Criminal and terrorist organizations have adapted to have the best of both worlds.

Even accepting the premise that the network groups are being weakened by the very characteristics that were supposed to make them more adaptable, they are still capable of providing a significant challenge to law enforcement officials. By the authors’ own admission, “the al-Qaida network has perpetrated some spectacular terrorist attacks,” even if many plots have been uncovered.[5] Terrorist groups have a much higher acceptance of failure, while most states operate in a zero-tolerance policy for terrorist and criminal attacks. While the success rate for terrorist organizations may be quite low, they only need to be successful occasionally to have the desired impact. Criminal groups pose a similar threat. Even if a particular cartel or leader is taken down, trafficking does not cease. The market shifts to cover the loss, and new groups rise up to fill the gap. Finally, all of the resources in an illicit group are going to the accomplishment of a single goal, while law enforcement has to respond to a wide variety of threats.

The weakened network structure posited by the authors proves to be either only partially true or ultimately irrelevant. Both criminal and terrorist groups continue to be a major law enforcement issues, and most seem to have evolved into a hybrid of hierarchical and networked systems. The idea that weaker, individual operators are a symbol of this weakened network structure is also flawed. It is certainly crucial for law enforcement officials to understand the nature of the threat, but illicit organizations are not weak networks collapsing from within.

**Written April 2012**

Bibliography

Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Mette, and Calvert Jones. “Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks.” International Security 33, no. 2 (Fall2008 2008): 7-44. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost

Gunaratna, Rohan and Aviv Oreg. “Al Qaeda’s Organizational Structure and its Evolution.” Studies In Conflict & Terrorism 33, no. 12 (December 2010): 1043-1078. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost.

Natarajan, Mangai. “Understanding the Structure of a Large Heroin Distribution Network: A Quantitative Analysis of Qualitative Data.” Journal Of Quantitative Criminology 22, no. 2 (June 2006): 171-192.Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost.

Spaaij, Ramon. “The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism: An Assessment.” Studies In Conflict & Terrorism 33, no. 9 (2010): 854-870. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost.

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[1] Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Calvert Jones. “Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks.” International Security 33, no. 2 (Fall2008 2008): 7-44. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost. 37

[2] Ramon Spaaij. “The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism: An Assessment.” Studies In Conflict & Terrorism 33, no. 9 (2010): 854-870. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost. 855

[3] Rohan Gunaratna and Aviv Oreg. “Al Qaeda’s Organizational Structure and its Evolution.” Studies In Conflict & Terrorism 33, no. 12 (December 2010): 1043-1078. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost.1044

[4] Mangai Natarajan. “Understanding the Structure of a Large Heroin Distribution Network: A Quantitative Analysis of Qualitative Data.” Journal Of Quantitative Criminology 22, no. 2 (June 2006): 171-192.Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost. 172

[5] Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones. “Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks.” 34

Six-Party Talks

Current Situation:

Over the past year, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has indicated a desire to resurrect the six-party talks with China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the US in return for international aid. All but China refuse to meet without preconditions such as the freezing of nuclear activities, allowing UN nuclear inspectors into the country, providing a nuclear inventory list, and shutting down the uranium enrichment program. North Korea faces shortages in both food and energy, which is likely driving their desire to resume talks. The US met with representatives from the DPRK on July 28 and 29, 2011 to discuss its willingness to take steps towards nuclear disarmament.

Security Outlook: Narco-Trafficking in Costa Rica

Scope Note

This intelligence estimate covers the security outlook for Costa Rica in relation to the increased narco-trafficking in the region. The estimate is exclusive of money laundering, arms trafficking, and any other transnational crime organization (TCO) activity or relations to terrorism, though they may become issues in the future if the narcotics threat is not contained.

Key Judgments

• Without some form of international assistance, narco-trafficking in Costa Rica will continue to rise and destabilize the country.
• Given the Costa Rican governmnent’s prior stability and low levels of corruption it is possible that the new drug issues could be successfully combatted with additional border security and coast guard funding/training.
• Any international interventions taken in Costa Rica are likely to have an impact in the surrounding countries.
• Drug legalization in Central American countries is not a valid solution to the crime and violence, given the US’s refusal to legalize drug use. Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTO’s) would continue to traffic up to the United States, and violence would likely continue to cause problems in the region.

Rule of Law in Afghanistan

The establishment of rule of law in Afghanistan is crucial to ensuring the success of the U.S. mission. Despite efforts to increase the efficacy of the criminal justice system, lawlessness is pervasive and the institutions are rife with corruption. This memo is intended to provide an overview of the situation on the ground, in addition to providing some potential avenues for response. First, there will be an analysis of the current situation, broken down into seven sector objectives. The goals and key projects will follow. Finally, we will identify major challenges to implementation that may hinder progress.

Current Situation
Establish Coherent, Legitimate, and Just Legal Frameworks: The 2004 Constitution created an entirely new legal system for Afghanistan, including a Supreme Court, Attorney General’s Office, police, Ministry of Justice and the prison service.[1] However, each institution tends to operate as a separate capacity, with little interconnectedness. The Constitution and the established institutions area seen as legitimate, and include both international norms and allowances for Shari’ah law.

Build Effective and Independent Courts: While many courts have been constructed, they were staffed with hastily trained judges and lawyers, and as such they remain ineffective. The judicial officials are also incredibly corrupt, often requiring bribes to hear cases or provide favorable judgements. In addition, the traditional justice systems of Jirga and shura are used to resolve the majority of disputes in the country, delegitimizing the formal court system. Taliban courts are also preferred over the formal justice system.

Build Effective Police, Customs, and Immigration Forces: The Afghan National Police remain a significant roadblock to establishing rule of law in Afghanistan. While additional training courses have helped increase the size of the ANP from around 33,000 in 2004 to over 149,000 in March 2012, they often focus only on testable skills.[2] They simply do not have the time to master the fundamentals of democratic policing and their understanding of basic human rights law is limited. The police are unable to prevent or respond to even the most simple of crimes. They do not have the clerical skills or the basic community policing skills needed to prevent the kind of disorder caused by crimes, both non-violent and violent. In addition, police training has a paramilitary focus that runs counter to the traditional police objective, decreases their legitimacy amongst the people and distracts the police from their true objective, which should be to serve and protect the local populace.

Build Effective Detention/Corrections Systems: The State Department is currently working on several areas related to detention, including infrastructure, the protection of vulnerable populations, and training for detention officers. However, inmates often lack access to proper nutrition, health care, and education, and those who are mothers often have to bring their children with them, resulting in the “collateral imprisonment” of many Afghan children.[3]

Build Effective Legal Profession/Bar: The Bar Association in Afghanistan was established in July 2008.[4] Currently, law students are taught primarily by rote, and the process to become a professor is both political and bureaucratic, affecting the overall quality of education.[5] Recent efforts by the international community to provide additional mid-career training assume a basic level of legal knowledge that is often non-existent. In addition, despite increased training requirements, less than half of judges have completed Stage, a one-year required training course.[6] Those who complete religious education requirements are allowed to hold judicial office despite lacking relevant legal skills.

Ensure Equal Access to Justice and Equal Application of the Law: Afghanistan remains unable to provide equal access to justice and equal application of the law. Women are routinely denied access to the legal system despite a Constitution that claims women and men are equal.[7] Rape, adultery, and domestic violence cases are not treated in accordance with international human rights standards.

Promote a culture of lawfulness and accountability: Through deficiencies in all of the above objectives, we have failed to promote a culture of lawfulness and accountability in Afghanistan. Officials in all justice sectors have a reputation for corruption. Most public officials operate with impunity while in power. There is little incentive for Afghans to follow the law or utilize the formal justice sector in a meaningful way.

Goals

The Department of State should focus on two primary goals: (1) ensuring a minimum level of training for all judges, lawyers, police officers, and detention officers; and (2) reducing corruption. The achievement of these two goals should assist in regaining legitimacy with the Afghan people, and ultimately build a strong rule of law foundation in Afghanistan.

Key Projects

The U.S. Department of State, USAID, U.S. Department of Justice, and U.S. Department of Defense, along with many international organizations, all have a vested interest in ensuring that Afghanistan achieves the rule of law end state. The following projects dovetail nicely with the above stated goals, and deserve the support of any resources we can provide.

Independent National Legal Training Center (INLTC): Created by a joint memorandum of understanding with the governments of Afghanistan, Italy and the United States, the INLTC provides mandatory one-year training to those entering the judiciary. USAID and NGO’s provide additional support. By expanding the training program, and developing a program for determining which active judges have not participated, the INLTC could provide even more benefits to the Afghan judicial system. The infrastructure is already in place, but they need assistance with regards to enforcement and possible expansion.

High Office for Oversight for the Implementation of the Anti-Corruption Strategy (HOO): Established in 2008, the HOO aims to reduce corruption throughout the Afghan government by simplifying some bureaucratic systems and creating an anti-corruption criminal unit.[8] Unfortunately, it has a limited operational capacity and is not independent enough to truly serve as an oversight institution. It needs stronger financial and professional support in order to become a functioning agency within the government.

Implementation Challenges

There are many challenges to implementation, not least of which is rampant corruption. Government officials are accustomed to acting with impunity and receiving bribes, which is a hard habit to break. Most corruption investigations are blocked, and those reporting corruption are often demoted or fired.[9] With corruption so ingrained in the culture, a rapid shift towards legitimacy is unlikely. Rather, the Afghan government and assisting agencies will have to slowly chip away at the problem. In part, they will have to develop innovative strategies for dealing with the narcotics trade, which accounts for significant portion of corruption and has resisted all efforts of containment or eradication.

Additionally, the training of officials in all sectors is lacking. While there have been innovative mid-career programs such as the INLTC, there needs to be standardized training at the university and entry-level in order to build the professions. The security situation will also need to be improved so that police can focus on community policing, and not on counterterrorism efforts.

Finally, all programs have to overcome the fact that the sequencing of earlier projects was not ideal. Rather than focusing on developing the fundamentals, many programs hoped to offer quick-fixes to long-held problems within the Afghan government. This challenge may prove to be the hardest to overcome, as it may involve the undoing of previous work in order to develop a stronger foundation in rule of law.

**Written May 2012**

Bibliography

Cohen, Tobi, “Justice in Afghanistan: Advocates say creation of bar association brings country closer to fair system” The Chronicle Herald. August 4, 2008. (http://www.afghanistannewscenter.com/news/2008/august/aug42008.html#13)

Farooqi, Malalai, “Collateral Imprisonment of Afghan Children: An Obstacle to Building the Afghan State”, University of La Verne Law Review, Vol 32:1 (2010-2011), p. 331 (329-356)

Livingston, Ian S. Livingston and Michael O’Hanlon, “Afghanistan Index,” Brookings Insitute, May 16, 2012, p. 6 (http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/programs/foreign%20policy/afghanistan%20index/index.pdf)

Swenson, Geoffrey and Eli Sugerman, “Building Rule of Law in Afghanistan”, Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 3 (2011), p. 136

Wardak, Ali, “State and Non-State Justice Systems in Afghanistan: The Need for Synergy”, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, Vol 35:2, (2011), p. 1307

“Women Gain Access to Justice” USAID, April 21, 2009. (http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/USAID/Article/858/Women_Gain_Access_to_Justice)

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[1] Ali Wardak “State and Non-State Justice Systems in Afghanistan: The Need for Synergy”, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, Vol 35:2, (2011), p. 1307

[2] Ian S. Livingston and Michael O’Hanlon, “Afghanistan Index,” Brookings Insitute, May 16, 2012, p. 6 http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/programs/foreign%20policy/afghanistan%20index/index.pdf

[3] Malalai Farooqi, “Collateral Imprisonment of Afghan Children: An Obstacle to Building the Afghan State”, University of La Verne Law Review, Vol 32:1 (2010-2011), p. 331 (329-356)

[4] Tobi Cohen. “Justice in Afghanistan: Advocates say creation of bar association brings country closer to fair system” The Chronicle Herald. August 4, 2008. (http://www.afghanistannewscenter.com/news/2008/august/aug42008.html#13)

[5] Geoffrey Swenson and Eli Sugerman, “Building Rule of Law in Afghanistan”, Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 3 (2011), p. 136

[6] ibid. 142

[7] “Women Gain Access to Justice” USAID, April 21, 2009. http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/USAID/Article/858/Women_Gain_Access_to_Justice

[8] Wardak, “State and Non-State Justice Systems in Afghanistan” p. 1312

[9] Wardak, ““State and Non-State Justice Systems in Afghanistan”, p.1314

Civil-Military Relations: An Integrative and Collaborative Approaach

Historically, discussions on civil-military relations were focused on how to prevent the military from entering into the frame of politics, whether by coup or other measure, as well as how to prevent politicians from using the military for illegitimate ends or domestic military intervention. Separation of the military and civilian realms was considered essential for maintaining civilian control, which was presumed to be the ideal way of managing the military. In addition, there was a clear delineation between military and societal ideals, and the two were considered to be incompatible. In recent years in the United States however, the military has become increasingly political, and the act of war itself has undergone technological changes that affect the way the military is utilized. A reevaluation of the civil-military relationship is required in order to keep up with this evolving military. In ideal civil-military relations, the subordination of the military to civilian control is assumed, but there would also be a high degree of collaboration between the military and their civilian leaders, as well as a degree of integration of the military into the political process. Ideal civil-military relations exist when the actions of each party serve to increase the effectiveness of the other, though this is increasingly difficult due to the rapidly evolving nature of war, the nature of bureaucratic government, and the unique character of the military.

Previous work on civil-military relations has often focused primarily on the differences between the members of the military and civilians, and for a valid reason. Military and civilian societies have historically been unique and isolated from one another. Prior to World War I, there was a discrete class in society for members of the military, and the military was completely subordinate to governmental control. Even more recently, in Huntington’s seminal work “The Soldier and the State” he posits that military professionals have a completely distinct mindset from that of civilians, and it affects the manner in which civil-military relations should be conducted. Ultimately, he believes that civilians should act alone in setting policy and overall strategy, while the military should be trusted with their expertise in determining tactics. The lines separating the two should not be blurred, either through the militarization of politics or the civilianizing of the military. Unfortunately, the blurring of the line is harder to avoid in today’s society. Military and civilian societies are increasingly integrated, with military leaders becoming politicians and politicians seeming to require military experience to establish their credibility in determining a strategy for defense. Rather than fight to maintain distinct military and civilian classes, the relationship should be reevaluated and a new paradigm of civil-military integration and collaboration developed.

The new collaboration ideal in civil-military relationships should focus on how both parties could work together to increase not only the efficacy of the military, but also the efficacy of the government as a whole, and could require a restructuring of the current system. Subordination in the classical sense is assumed, as the military would function more as a tool of the civilian government in achieving international security goals through physical force and less as an independent agency. The chief allegiance of top military leaders would be to the Constitution and goals of the United States, not to a particular branch of service or even to the military in general. After all, “the point of civilian control is to make security subordinate to the larger purposes of the nation, rather than the other way around,” and requiring that military leaders be loyal to those larger goals would help ensure the dominance of civilian purposes.[1] In an integrated model, the Department of Defense would be analogous to any other governmental department in that the civilian government would set the strategy and the Department of Defense would work within its mission to accomplish that goal. Anything beyond the scope of the defense mission would be assigned to a more appropriate department. Although a reduction in the scope of current military operations could occur, and other departments would have to be created to address the non-military issues currently handled by defense agencies, this would only serve to increase the ability of the military to fulfill its primary functional imperative. The military would be free to focus on issues solely related to the use of force in deterring war and protecting the security of the United States, and would not be responsible for the more political issues currently utilizing military resources, such as “winning the hearts and minds” of native populations or nation-building activities.

Collaboration comes into play when discussing how the new, more integrated Department of Defense would interact both with the legislative and executive branches as well as with other departments within the U.S. government. Initially, the President and Congress would work to set the overall goals for the country, in addition to any logistical bounds they wished to remain within, whether budget, time or personnel related. If the plan were to require military participation, top military officials would be present at congressional meetings prior to setting the goal, and would also participate in discussions with the other relevant departments in order to determine the tactical approach. Each department would tackle the issue that most closely related to their area of expertise. Post-implementation, department directors would be in close contact with one another to ensure that the work of each agency involved was geared towards the same outcome. In this way, each U.S. strategic goal would be accomplished through the efficient use of the most appropriate resources.

In times of peace, this strategy would be fairly easy to implement. Without a specific international security goal to work towards, the military would remain on hand to support any goal that may come to require military force. The Department of Defense could reallocate their resources toward their more passive mission of deterring war and away from their more active mission of protecting the security of the country through physical force. As long as the military remained within their limited scope and did not interfere with the accomplishment of other U.S. strategic goals, they would have free reign in determining how best to utilize their resources.

The ability of the collaborative model to increase efficacy would be highlighted during times of conflict. Since top military leaders would be integrated into the decision making process, political leaders would be able to make informed judgments on the United States level of military preparedness, as well as any potential issues that could arise from a tactical perspective. Similarly, military leaders would have a strong grasp of why military action was needed from a political standpoint, and could tailor recommendations to more closely accomplish the most ultimate goal. A high level of transparency between the decision makers of both parties would help to avoid detours from the underlying mission. Time and again, a rigid separation between military and civilian actors has proven ineffective in times of military action, and in the collaborative model, the infrastructure for communication both between agencies and with the executive and legislative branches would already be in place, hastening the speed with which a strategy could be decided upon, delegated, and implemented. The support of other agencies would allow the military to focus exclusively on its mission of protecting the security of the United States.

However, the nature of war is rapidly evolving due to advancements in both technology and thought processes, and what was once a fairly straightforward subject is now extremely nuanced. The military strategies used in the War on Terror are unlike those used in previous engagements, and seem to be combining tactics from both military and diplomatic approaches. In a collaborative approach, each agency would only be responsible for that segment where their skills were most applicable. The military could have initially been involved only for the removal of terrorist cells and high value targets, and then turned over operations to the Department of State for the diplomatic work of nation building. Unfortunately, current military operations are not quite that clear cut. If the military were confined to a very specific mission and limited tactical library, it may end up affecting their ability to complete the mission in the most effective way possible. The rapid pace at which situations develop and the need for a multifaceted approach would require that either diplomatic specialists be embedded with the military, potentially putting them in harms way, or that the military expand their mission and train in diplomatic as well as military tactics. An expanded military mission would potentially lead to increased military autonomy, harming the collaborative and integrative approach. On the other hand, the ability of the armed forces to engage in a variety of tactics would allow for a smooth transition between approaches and potentially increase efficiency beyond what could be accomplished through delegation.

No matter how efficient and effective this approach might be in theory, in practice it requires a level of coordination that may be impossible to achieve. The relatively rapid turnover in Congress and the Oval Office helps to ensure that no true grand strategy can be developed at the civilian level, and the current levels of discourse have shown that reaching a consensus on a short-term goal, even within Congress, would have its political difficulties. Simply put, it would be difficult to set the initial strategic goal. In addition, there is currently no structure in place to allow for rapid communication among agencies or departments, which would be required for collaboration to work as effectively as it should. Currently, the various departments work relatively independently, and to work collaboratively would require a significant shift in mindset that may be impossible to achieve. Finally, the amount of time it would take to convince people in every agency of the appropriate course of action may be            prohibitive. It is difficult enough for current members of the National Security Council, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and government officials to come to a consensus; adding representatives from additional agencies may slow down the process even further.

The unique character of the military further prevents the achievement of the ideal. There is a strong sense of duty and loyalty that exists in the military in a manner not found in any other branch of the government. To treat the military in a manner similar to that of the other agencies would be to dismiss the unique qualities that have helped to shape U.S. military since its inception and that have carried the United States through several international conflicts. While the upper echelons of military leadership have developed an increasingly political bent, the majority of the active duty military strongly identify as members of the Army, Navy, or Air Force, not as employees of the United States government. Since the top leaders come from that same background, it stands to reason that they would be reluctant to alter that identity for the sake of expediency. There is a deserved distinction between civilian and military that could potentially be lost were this ideal to carried out in practice.

While the collaborative and integrative model of civilian-military relations is ideal in theory, there are some issues in implementation. A reevaluation of the military-civilian relationship suggests that a combination of political and military aims is more likely than the maintenance of a strong distinction between the two, and the ability of the U.S. government to quickly utilize resources from all agencies would assist in the quick and effective accomplishment of major U.S. strategic goals. However, the unique nature of the military, combined with the changing character of war and the inefficiencies inherent in bureaucratic governments would hinder both effective interagency communication and the extent to which the military would want or be able to integrate.

**Written in October 2011*

Bibliography

Huntington, Samuel P. The Soldier and the State: the Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. Cambridge: Belknap of Harvard UP, 1957. Print.

Kohn, Richard H. “How Democracies Control the Military.” Journal of Democracy 8.4 (1997): 140-53.

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[1] Kohn 142

Waste, Fraud, Abuse, and Inefficiency

           The world of defense policy is filled with conventional wisdom and repeated generalizations, some of which have a firmer foundation in truth than others. Of particular contention are those generalizations regarding the acquisition process and the defense budget, especially given the current economic climate. The process is often accused of being “broken” and replete with inefficiencies, in addition to generating excessively high levels of waste, fraud, and abuse within the system. The issue of waste, fraud, and abuse is particularly contentious, and many believe it is one of the biggest problems facing the defense system.  While it is true that the defense acquisition process is inefficient, the claims of waste and abuse are exaggerated and more likely to be indicative of a deeper, more systemic issue of a lack of governmental control over private contractors.

            When it comes to spending and acquisition, the Department of Defense is indeed inefficient. Congressmen serve their parochial interests, lobbyists work hard to generate even more work for defense contractors, and the mutual dependence between the Department of Defense and contractors removes any potential efficiency created by a free-market atmosphere. Part of the reason that this process is inefficient is that it was designed to be that way, and conflict is “both unavoidable and intentional, because many actors with many varied interests have their hands in the process”[1]. Separation of powers is a key component of the U.S. democratic system, and it extends to the budget process, where we could “expect to see nontrivial funding diverted to economically inefficient activities” as a result of “political influences, externally generated demands, and organizational inertia”[2]. Though Congress maintains control over setting the entire defense budget, including distribution and major program decisions, “the budget is put together from proposals from each of the military services, and each service has a key role in buying its own equipment.”[3] While design by committee is an essentially democratic process, it does not promote organizational efficiency. Were Congress to function more autocratically, and dictate programs and budget divisions to the military, some of the inefficiencies could be lessened. However, Congress functions more as an overseer, guiding the Department in a general direction but leaving the particulars to the military and civilian leaders in the field. When the budget decision makers do not have the information needed to correctly judge the needs of the budgeted program, nor the ability to enforce any particular direction, inefficiencies are bound to arise.

Without a deeper insight into the “why” of defense decision-making, Congress relies on the information to which they do have access and which generally reflects parochial interests. Rather than take an objective look at the security needs of the country, congressmen expend a lot of effort ensuring that big defense programs and bases in their regions are maintained. After all, even those “who favor shrinking the military’s overall footprint prefer the specific cuts to fall on someone else.”[4] While the Base Realignment and Closure Act helped reduce some of these inefficiencies with regard to bases, the big defense programs are still protected by the congressmen whose districts receive benefits from such programs. These congressmen essentially become “lobbyists for the program … cajoling their colleagues in the legislature and agreeing to trade votes with them.”[5] Even if a program does not fit into the overall strategy, is not particularly wanted by the services, or is extremely expensive, the local impacts on their personal districts leads Congress to continue funding programs that may be inefficient or even unnecessary.

In addition to inefficiencies at the planning level, inefficiencies also exist at the production level. As private companies, defense contractors have an interest in maximizing their profits, which means lobbying for a continuous succession of projects even though “stored aircraft and ships could be used to maintain the U.S. force structure for a number of years before new procurement is required.”[6] Contractors have the political clout necessary to keep the funding coming, despite the fact that the U.S. military is fairly well stocked and certainly more technologically advanced than any other military force in the world. The disconnect between the actual need and the excessive production is in large part due to the Cold War build-up which led to a huge increase in the number of production lines. Post-war, contractors were loath to shut them down, and, as mentioned above, congressmen were happy to keep lines in their districts open. Contractors were thus able to maintain their production lines, segmenting products and scattering the production of those pieces to numerous plants across the country. While this certainly helps the local economies where the plants are functioning, it does not make for an efficient production process.

Finally, the mutual dependency of defense contractors and the Department of Defense has led to the development of a contract state that is inevitably more inefficient than the true free-market that contractors were meant to emulate. As the contractors become increasingly enmeshed in the world of defense, producing for a single buyer, they begin to develop the characteristics of a government agency themselves. While the “tasks of the old public arsenals migrated to the defense industry…government funding of private-sector research and capital investment took some of the ‘privateness’ away from defense companies.”[7] Now, instead of functioning as a private enterprise, the most successful contractors have learned the ropes of the governmental oversight process, and know the exact processes necessary to win a bid. Entire sections of their company are dedicated to managing governmental regulations, rather than directing their efforts on producing competitive products in a manner similar to a true private enterprise. In return, the U.S. gets a process that is slightly less efficient than it might otherwise expect.

            Even though the acquisition and budget process is not optimized for efficiency, the accusations of “waste, fraud and abuse” are not truly the problem, despite what conventional wisdom might suggest. Instead, they are symptoms of other, bigger, issues that are the result of decreased governmental oversight and competition. With regards to waste, it “is almost unavoidable; somewhere along the path of developing a new weapon system, wrong turns will be taken, to be exposed only by testing and further development.”[8] While it would certainly be more efficient for a company to come up with a concept, develop it, and have it work perfectly from conception to production, that scenario is simply not realistic. Waste exists in research and development across a variety of industries, and should be considered one of the costs of innovation. As a result of the cyclical defense budget, contractors have begun to pursue both research and production at the same time in order to ensure that their projects continue to receive funding. This leads to costly adjustments and patches in the production phase, in addition to imparting “inflexibility to the development of new weapons by embedding early design choices” and reducing the ability to re-focus after new technologies have been developed.[9] Rather than try to eliminate waste from the defense budget altogether, the real focus should be on transferring waste from the production phase, where it currently resides, to the relatively cheaper research phase.

The issue of fraud and abuse suffers from a similar misconception. While recent reports indicate that “defense firms over the last decade ripped off the military to the tune of $1.1 trillion,” the more pressing issue is how fraud continues to proliferate within the defense industry despite increased government knowledge of fraudulent activities.[10] At this point, contractors are “so involved in designing the contracts, setting the points for evaluation, and recording the results that they are practically in charge of the process,” so it should not come as a surprise when they occasionally abuse the system.[11]  In the past, the U.S. government was so intent on privatizing the defense industry that it neglected to retain some control over the oversight process, continually delegating more oversight responsibility to people who are not operating in the best interest of the country, but rather working for a company that is trying to extract as much profit as possible from the contract. Should the government take back responsibility for program oversight, it is likely that the amount of abuse would decrease.

In addition, the process of selecting contractors has become politicized to the point where it serves as a huge barrier to entry, further decreasing competition and increasing the ability of the existing contractors to perpetuate their fraud and abuse. With increasing amounts of bureaucratic paperwork and lobbying, “skill in dealing with the government is in fact one of their [defense contractors] core competencies.”[12] Developing that skill takes time and opportunity, and with the major firms already in place, it is difficult for a new firm to find an opening and thereby increase competition. Each of the major firms can assert their specialty and receive the majority of the projects in that area, so that each firm is able to subsist mainly from their government work. As the only major players, they have the ability to commit fraud and waste as the usual checks imposed by a free market do not apply to them. Were the government to decrease barriers to entry, forcing firms to be more accurate in their bids and less expensive, the opportunity to abuse the system would be diminished.

While waste, fraud, and abuse certainly exist, they are not the biggest problem in the defense industry as many might suggest. Rather, they serve as a sign to a greater underlying problem related to a lack of governmental oversight over what has become a primarily private industry. However, the conventional wisdom about the inefficiency of the system does hold true, though it exists that way primarily by design. The generalizations grant a superficial look at the world of defense policy, and unpacking them and examining their roots leads to a much deeper understanding of the issues surrounding the defense budget as it exists today.

**Written in September 2011**

Bibliography

Bennett, J. T. (2011, October 23). Lawmakers push Defense fraud, waste report to influence supercommittee cuts. Retrieved from The Hill: http://www.thehill.com

Gholz, E., & Sapolsky, H. (Winter 1999). Restructuring the U.S. Defense Industry. International Security, 24(3), 5-51.

Lewis, K. N. (1994). The Discipline Gap and Other Reasons for Humility and Realism in Defense Planning. In P. Davis (Ed.), New Challenges for Defense Planning (pp. 101-132). RAND Corporation.

McNaugher, T. L. (1989). Weapons Procurement: The Futility of Reform. In M. Mandelbaum (Ed.), America’s Defense (pp. 68-112). Holmes & Meier.

Sapolsky, H., Gholz, E., & Talmadge, C. (2009). US Defense Politics: The Origins of Security Policy. New York: Routledge.

 

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[1] Sapolsky, Gholz and Talmadge, US Defense Politics: The Origins of Security Policy (New York; Routledge, 2009) 130.

[2] Lewis, The Discipline Gap and Other Reasons for Humility and Realism in Defense Planning, 102

[3] Sapolsky, Gholz and Talmadge 75

[4] Sapolsky, Gholz and Talmadge 67

[5] Sapolsky, Gholz and Talmadge 70

[6] Gholz and Sapolsky 12

[7] Sapolsky, Gholz and Talmadge 70

[8] McNaugher Weapons Procurement: The Futility of Reform 70

[9] McNaugher 92

[10] Bennett, “Lawmakers push Defense fraud, waste report to influence supercommittee cuts” Oct. 2011

[11] Sapolsky, Gholz and Talmadge 160

[12] Gholz and Sapolsky 16